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Abstract: Institutional transplants is the name given to formal institutions which are transferred from 
one institutional setting to another. They are one of the possible channels for institutional change. The 
success of an institutional transplant depends on its interaction with its new environment. Previous 
research, based on the methodology of neoclassical economics (and to some extent - of the new 
institutional economics), is limited in its ability to predict the success of such transplants. We propose 
a framework for an organic approach for the analysis of institutional transplants in the economic 
context, which has a potential to overcome these limitations. This could enable policy-makers to take 
better decisions when undertaking institutional reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
Institutional transplants is the name given to formal institutions when they are 
transferred from one country to another (or, more generally, from one institutional 
setting to another). Usually, when the transfer is an attempt of imitation and when 
it is voluntary, the goal is higher institutional efficiency, which leads to a general 
improvement of welfare
3
. The success of such a transfer is by no means 
guaranteed. It is the result of a number of factors, among which especially 
important is the role of the sociocultural environment. Ignoring it could lead to 
failure of social and economic policies. 
The present article states that institutional efficiency for most of the time is of a 
relative, and not of an absolute character. Efficiency depends on the interaction of 
the behavioral stimuli arising from the institutional transplant itself, and on the 
stimuli coming from the general (both natural and sociocultural) environment, 
which exists at the time of the transfer and where human actions take place. The 
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ignoring of these factors, hence the failure of the policies is largely due to the 
chosen methodological approach of analysis, which is usually of a 
monodeterministic character. This leads to the construction of a limited 
explanatory framework that serves as the basis for predictions about the effects of a 
policy, without taking into consideration the complexity and dynamics of the 
environment. Thus the value of such predictions is eroded. It is especially relevant 
to policies in the economic area, which are the result of analysis, based on the 
instrumentarium of the neoclassical economics
1
 - methodological individualism, 
rationality of agents and maximizing of personal welfare (often equated with 
personal wealth) (see Arnsperger & Varoufakis, 2006; Sugden, 1991; Vanberg, 
2004). Here we offer an organic approach, based on methodological pluralism, 
which could overcome some of the limitations of the existing approach. It can 
serve as a basis for analysis when borrowing economic policies and as a tool to 
decrease the errors that accompany this process. 
 
2. Limitation of the Neoclassical Approach for the Explanation of 
Institutional Change 
There are a number of hypotheses that try to explain the emergence of new and the 
changing of existing institutions (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). These can be 
broadly divided into two categories. In the first, institutional change is regarded as 
the result of a purposeful process that is centralized, where the decision is taken by 
a single figure of power or by many people within an existing mechanism for 
collective decision-making. In the other, institutions emerge as the result of a 
decentralized process, akin to the evolutionary. In both cases it doesn't matter 
whether the institutions were the result of a purposeful design or whether they 
emerged spontaneously. The only thing that matters is their fitness and efficiency - 
whether the rules on which they are based leads to the prosperity and thriving of 
the societies that have adopted them
2
. 
This categorization is to a certain extent arbitrary, because the dimensions 
―conscious ‖ (purposeful) - ―unconscious ‖ (not purposeful) could penetrate both 
the centralized and the decentralized process of the establishment of new 
institutions. Conscious actions can have unforeseen consequences and the newly 
created institutions may take on functions which were not originally intended
3
. 
                                                          
1 Actually, neoclassical economics doesn't pay much attention to institutions. Instead it takes certain 
institutions for granted (e.g. property rights). Then, discussing it in the context of institutional change 
may seem out of place. But the new institutional economics (including transaction cost econom 
2 This argument can be traced back at least to Marx (1969), who claims in chapter 1 of "The 
Communist manifesto" that capitalism destroys the old forms of social organization. Even the most 
barbaric nations are forced to either become civilized (and adopt capitalist modes of production) or 
become extinct. They just can't compete economically with the bourgeois society. 
3 Henry VIII overthrew papal authority, when the Pope refused to recognize the king's divorce as 
legitimate. Probably England's development would have been different, had Catholicism remained the 
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Meanwhile in the evolutionary process the effectiveness of the respective 
institutions determines their stability and propagation, compared to other 
institutional forms, but at a lower level a given institutional form may be the result 
of a conscious design. Also, decision-makers can purposefully reject an existing 
institutional arrangement and introduce another, which they expect to be more 
efficient. That is, the evolutionary process can take place even if there is a 
conscious criterion for selection. 
It is here where we can look for the place of institutional transplants in this 
categorization, because, as it has already been mentioned, they are institutional 
arrangements which are transferred from one institutional setting to another. 
Examining institutional change in the context of institutional transplants, we should 
rule out the creation of new institutions that do not exist elsewhere, as well as of 
institutions which exist elsewhere and are not borrowed, but are discovered or 
emerge independently. 
Institutional transplants can be examined in the context of evolutionary theories of 
institutional change, because the decision to adopt a specific institutional 
arrangement, which exists elsewhere, should be at least partly related to the belief 
that this will lead to greater efficiency. Borrowing and imitation is often an 
effective and resource-efficient approach and institution-building makes no 
exception. In most cases it is easier to recognize an effective structure than to find a 
way to build it from scratch. This would allow the transfer of institutions whose 
final form is too complex to be discovered independently. These are institutions 
that arise spontaneously and are based on the imposition of a few simple rules that 
lead to the emergence of a complex structure and mechanisms of interaction. 
Sometimes it is very difficult to relate the desired form of social organization to the 
rules which create it. Replication of the ―rules of the game‖ from countries, where 
these institutional forms exist, gives a partial solution to this problem. 
The introduction of new institutions, either by transplanting them or by some other 
way, could face several obstacles (Kingston & Caballero, 2009, pp. 172–175). The 
first derives from the ―free-rider problem‖ related to the collective decision-making 
process. Even if the members of the public realize the benefits of the new 
institutions, from the perspective of each independent individual it may be rational 
not to get personally involved in the establishment of the new institutions, but to 
leave it to others instead. Naturally, given that society is mainly composed by 
rational individuals who seek to maximize their utility, then the majority of the 
individuals will act accordingly (i.e. not act) and eventually the status quo will 
prevail. 
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The second obstacle to institutional change has a relation to the first one. But the 
obstacle here is not the presence of free-riders (who have an interest in the change, 
though no interest in getting involved personally). Instead, it is the existence of 
groups who have vested interest in the status quo. A given institutional 
arrangement can bring net benefits to society in general, however there might be 
losers. Even if the gains exceed the losses, the winners might not want or simply 
might not be able to compensate the losers. The redistribution effects could lead to 
resistance to the change. Whether this resistance will be successful depends on the 
balance of powers, which in turn are determined (among other things) by the 
existing institutions. Thus, the resources, accumulated under a given institutional 
arrangement, determine to some extent the available paths for institutional 
development in the future. 
Another obstacle for the appearance of new institutional forms is the 
interdependence of the old institutions with institutions from other areas of social 
life, in particular - with other economic institutions. E.g., the automatic transfer of 
bankruptcy rules for legal persons from one legal system to another will depend 
largely on the relations and references of this field of the law with the general 
character of the existing institution of property rights and the specific forms that 
legal persons take there. Radical changes in some fields can be stultified by the 
lack of changes in interrelated fields. 
The fourth reason that can impede favorable institutional change is the bounded 
rationality of the agents. What is more, new institutions often appear in a complex 
and dynamic environment where information is scarce or hardly accessible. Thus 
people might miss on the opportunity to undertake the change, simply because they 
don't recognize the advantages of the new arrangement. 
The fifth source of institutional inertia and stability of the old institutions arises 
from endogenous preferences. Existing institutions can influence the behavior of 
the people, which can result in habit formation, and through that they can affect 
tastes and preferences. In this way some institutions can become self-sustaining, by 
reinforcing tastes and preferences which are favorable to the institutions' existence. 
The sixth reason for the resilience of the old institutions bears resemblance to the 
previous. The separate individual affects institutional formation, but institutions 
themselves shape the individuals. Similar role is performed by the sociocultural 
environment, too
1
. By filling with content our believes and values, this 
environment determines the direction and intensity of our desires. The influence of 
informal institutions may be similar in character to the influence, exercised by 
                                                          
1 The individual becomes an individual in the society. In the words of Goldschmidt (Goldschmidt, 
Zweynert, Nerré, & Schuß, 2006, p. 180, col. 2) ―...the very process of individualization is to be 
understood as a process of enculturation at the same time. The individual becomes only an individual 
because of his social learning‖. 
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formal institutions in the form of sanctions and rewards. It can do so through 
mechanism of behavioral control within certain social networks. These 
mechanisms can be enforced by the members of the network without the 
involvement of the state or other centralized institutions (e.g. in the form of 
reputational effects). 
The reasons, mentioned above, stand in the way of institutional change in principle, 
and in particular in the transfer of institutions from one setting to another. 
However, the problem examined here is a little bit more specific. It is not simply a 
matter of rejecting new institutions, but a case where new institutions are 
introduced in a different sociocultural and institutional setting under the 
assumption that they are (generally) efficient, although the case for their efficiency 
has been only made under specific circumstances. This is not an argument against 
the borrowing of good practices and institutional transplants. The justifications to 
resort to the latter have been already mentioned above. Besides, an institutional 
arrangement that has proven itself to be efficient in a given setting usually will be a 
little more convincing in its usefulness than an arrangement, which just looks good 
on paper but has not been implemented anywhere. However when an institution is 
borrowed it should be done so with the assumption that its efficiency may be of a 
relative, and not of an absolute character, and that it is a function of the interaction 
between the new institution and the other formal and informal institutions that exist 
in the new setting. Institutional transplants are not novelty in human history, but 
they have become more topical in the last decades, as the easy access to 
information has made institutional borrowing faster, without them having proved 
themselves to be efficient in the first place. Besides, the social, cultural, and 
economic differences between the borrowing country and the country of origin 
might be larger than in previous times. (Mamadouh; Jong, & Lalenis, 2003, p. 281) 
It should be noted that the first three obstacles to institutional change - free-riders, 
vested interests, and interrelations between the institutions - are not necessarily 
insurmountable for the methodology of neoclassical economics
1
 and the potential 
success (or lack of, thereof) of institutional transplant can be explained under the 
assumptions of rationality, individual utility maximization, and methodological 
individualism. In most cases it would be enough to take into consideration the 
influence of the behavioral stimuli arising from the aforementioned three obstacles. 
It is less so for the other three obstacles - bounded rationality, preference 
endogenity, and the influence of the informal institutional and sociocultural 
environment. Then the existing approach faces significant limitations. 
                                                          
1 The analysis from the point of view of neoclassical economics can be also incomplete, but for 
another reason. It's actually the opposite problem of the one that has been described so far - why some 
institutions are adopted, when we expect that they shouldn't. E.g., the conclusion that a specific 
institution will not be introduced because of free-riders might be wrong if we ignore the motivating 
forces of ideology and values, which urge the separate individuals to take action (e.g. voting at 
elections), even though the costs exceed the benefits for this particular action. See North (1988).  
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The application of the approach offered below questions the existence of efficient 
institutions, where efficiency is absolute. The efficiency of an institution is relative, 
it depends on the context. This is twofold. On one hand, efficiency relates to the 
goals of society, and the goals can differ for the different societies. On the other 
hand, even with identical goals, but with differences in important aspects of the 
social environment (economic, political and cultural), an institution that gives good 
results in one country may fail to do so in another. 
The question of efficiency refers less to the question whether the respective 
institution will provide the same results in the borrowing country as in the original 
country, and more to the question whether the borrowed institution would bring 
better results than its alternatives. Allen (2011) gives a number of examples for 
institutions from pre-industrial England, which from the modern point of view look 
very inefficient, but they are very reasonable when examined in their context
1
. 
Actually, the introduction of modern institutions at the time would have been a 
waste for most of the time. 
The hypothesis for the relative efficiency of institutions is especially topical in the 
context of the prescriptions for economic reforms, encouraged by some 
international institutions. This applies both to the introduction of new institutions 
and to the removal of existing ones. With deregulation the relations between 
market agents are preserved but their conduct and coordination will be 
accomplished through informal mechanisms, hence the importance of the 
sociocultural environment will be higher. Although the results from given 
regulative measures can differ, when they are conducted in different settings, it 
would be even more so with the results from deregulation. While formal 
institutions can suppress the informal (and so lead to partial convergence of 
results), in the absence of formal institutions (i.e. deregulation) the results will 
depend almost entirely on the informal institutions and the sociocultural 
environment
2
. Probably the deregulation of an economic sector in Sweden will not 
lead to the same results as its deregulation in Bulgaria. For example the easy access 
to information is generally considered to be a positive feature of the institutional 
environment that makes doing business easier. In the context of the Trade registry 
such access would allow knowing your (potential) business partners better. In 2011 
an argument was started in Bulgaria to what extent such a practice is suitable for 
the local conditions (Босев, 2011). It was provoked by the increased number of 
―theft ‖ of companies where, on the basis of existing documents, new ones were 
prepared (e.g. records of proceedings), but with changed information about owners 
                                                          
1 For example, law enforcement was carried out largely by private and quasi-public institutions. 
Another example would be that public offices were taken not on the basis of the qualities, 
demonstrated by the individuals, but by the highest bidder. Such practices existed even for army 
officers. 
2 To paraphrase Tolstoy - regulated markets are all alike, every deregulated market is deregulated in 
its own way. 
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and shareholders, thus gaining control over the firm. According to some members 
of the Parliament the easy access to company files through the internet had made it 
easy to falsify documents. That is why they initiated legal changes to restrict the 
access to the Trade registry through the internet with the intention to make it 
possible to trace who and when had access to the information from the Registry
1
. 
 
3. A framework of an Alternative Approach 
The approach presented here
2
 tries to overcome the limitations, arising from the 
mono-approaches (understood as determinism of one or a limited small number of 
factors). Using this new approach as a starting point for analysis one could achieve 
a better explanation and prediction about the eventual success of concrete 
institutional transplants in the economy. 
3.1. Holistic Polydeterminism 
Individual actions are determined by the social environment, but at the same time 
they influence it in turn, because they are carried out in this environment. The 
social environment as a factor of development is not limited to a specific type of 
determinism, but is a mixture of the simultaneous influence of economic, political 
and cultural factors. The domination of one of these factors at any given moment 
does not rule out the influence of the others. 
The economic environment includes all economic institutions. It has a direct 
influence on the economic agents and finds its expression in the market and in its 
regulation, related to competition and economic power. In broader terms it includes 
the immediate participants, the condition and factors for production of goods and 
services. The political environment consists of all political institutions. It 
influences economic development and the economic agents through the entire 
process of management arising from the political process mainly in two directions. 
First, as the political power to enforce formal rules and second, as the realization of 
revenues and expenditures for the provision of public goods. 
The sociocultural environment influences the individuals through its institutions, 
too. It does so through moral, psychological, customs-related and other limitations, 
imposed during the pursuit of economic interests. One of the main channels of 
influence, arising from culture, are values. Values are related to goal-setting. 
Culture can be involved in the formation of new preferences, which the economy 
strives to fulfill. 
                                                          
1 Although according to some investigative journalists the motives for this motion were to prevent 
journalists from finding out the relations between politicians and their family members with 
companies. 
2 It is a brief overview of the approach, shown in more details in Минчев (2013). 
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The overall picture, representing the movement of the social system, depicts a 
continuous struggle for realization of the social subjects by asserting their own 
goals as goals of the others, depending on the balance of powers. This assertion is 
modified by the others' strength and is expressed in various ways in the history of 
society. The clash of interests finds a relative rest in institutions. As it has already 
been mentioned, the domination of the economic, political or sociocultural 
environment depends on the way in which these environments interact and on the 
specific form and development of each one of them. 
The social environment, being a mixture of economic, political and sociocultural 
environment, is the environment where individual and group interests are 
immersed. It consists of institutions which determine the behavior of the 
individuals. The individuals are driven by their interests, which they pursue with 
concrete, inherent for them power, and the institutions - by a system of 
organizations and rules, which are the result of a compromise and a dynamic 
balance of the powers of these very same individuals. Actually the institutional 
setting is a social redefining of the scarcity that exists in nature. Thus, it is either 
intensified or redistributed. 
3.2. An Arganic Approach 
The approach is based on three dialectical relations, which serve as a connecting 
node for three different approaches that are often used separately. These are the 
dialectical relations between dialectics and eclecticism (the eclectic approach is a 
form of expression of a continuously changing determinism), between 
individualism and holism (the many individual actions form the whole, and it in 
turn - the individual), and between existence and consciousness. 
The organic approach suggests methodological pluralism and in the explanation of 
the human and social development it is based on the dialectical total unity of the 
human, the social environment, and the natural environment as factors of this 
development. It depends on the context (the specific time and place) which element 
of this unity (human, social or natural environment) will dominate. The elements 
constantly blend and turn into one another, they are in continuous motion. In every 
moment one of the elements might dominate, but the unity remains. Between the 
elements and within the elements there are contradictions, which are in unity and 
struggle and this ensures the motion of the system. The Earth, society and the 
human are regarded as totalities each, and not just as separate characteristics of 
these elements. 
The organic approach reflects the totality and unity of and interdisciplinary 
approach, individualism and holism, subjective and objective, deductive and 
inductive approach. Individualism is necessary in the social sciences because the 
human is at the basis of every action and condition in society. It is wrong to 
employ it as the only approach because taken to its logical conclusion, it is a failure 
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of society and replaces society with the laws of the jungle. Holism is necessary in 
the social sciences, because the whole limits the individuals in their actions. It is 
inappropriate as the only approach because taken to its logical conclusion, it is a 
failure of the individual and negation of individual differences. 
The organic approach requires also unity of the objective and the subjective. The 
actions of the individual are subjective, but they are transformed into objective 
facts. On the other hand, objective facts and processes influence the individuals 
when they make subjective decisions. What is more, the subjective actions of the 
many are objective processes for the separate individuals. This approach suggests 
unity of deduction and induction. When only the deductive approach is used and 
the inductive is ignored, we are deprived of our initial position for deductive 
reasoning. If we use the inductive process before the deductive, we can get a better 
estimation where to stop the process of abstraction. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The framework of an approach outlined above has the potential for a richer 
explanation of the social processes and more specifically - for a richer explanation 
about the expected results when borrowing specific institutional arrangements. This 
doesn't mean that it is capable of giving a categorical answer to the question how a 
new institution will fit in its setting, but that it is a better starting point for the 
analysis. Nor is it a call to reject the methodology of neoclassical economics. In 
contrast, this methodology has proven itself in time and it has its applications, but 
one should consider its limitations and the cases for which it is suitable. The 
examination of institutional transplants is one of these cases where the limitations 
are manifested, because the successful transfer of institutions depends on factors, 
which are not considered by the neoclassical approach - such as the sociocultural 
environment and the role of habits. 
With all its shortcomings the neoclassical methodology has the pretense of 
comprehensiveness, leaving aside whether the pretense is justified or not. The 
scientific value of a methodology is higher when it allows to make as many as 
possible general-case predictions based on the available data and when the data 
available is easy to measure and quantify. Even when an approach yields 
ontologically true statements, it might not yet be attractive for scientific work and 
policy-making. It is probably even more so for the latter, because policy-makers 
usually prefer straightforward and simple solutions with less conditionalities. 
The organic approach gives fulness to the analysis and is more relevant to reality 
than the mono-approaches (be it methodological individualism or a 
monodeterministic holism). But at this stage of its development its practical 
application and its usefulness as a guide for taking concrete decisions is more an art 
than science, where the evaluation of the ways in which the determinants of social 
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development interact is the result largely of the intuition and the introspective 
abilities of the analyst. To some extent it is an unavoidable element of the analysis 
of dynamic and complex systems. Further efforts are required to make this 
approach fit for empirical work and to transform it into an approach that will allow 
its transferability as a decision-making algorithm. If possible, this should happen 
with a minimum loss of its descriptive fullness. 
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